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ABSTRACT 
 
Organizations operate under ongoing pressure to conduct product development (PD) in ways that 
reduce errors, improve product designs, and increase speed and efficiency. Often, managers are expected 
to respond to this pressure by implementing process improvement programs (PIPs) based on best practices 
elsewhere (e.g., in another part of their organization or in another industrial context). Successful PIP 
implementation depends on two criteria: (1) demonstrating (symbolic) success by meeting externally 
imposed deadlines and producing mandated artefacts and (2) sustaining the expected (substantive) changes 
in their employees’ underlying beliefs and practices. Given the mixed success of PIPs in non-manufacturing 
contexts, identifying factors that contribute to both symbolic and substantive implementation is important 
to both researchers and practitioners. We explore this challenge through an in-depth field study at a PD 
company (DevCo) that implemented a PIP across its 11 PD projects. We examine DevCo’s change message 
to implement the PIP, how DevCo’s engineers experienced it, factors that impeded implementation, and 
factors that could improve substantive success. Along with this empirical evidence, we leverage 
organizational change concepts to facilitate effective PIP implementation in new contexts such as PD. We 
distill our findings into eight propositions that expand theory about effectively transferring PIPs across 
contexts. 
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1 Introduction 
Process improvement programs (PIPs) are organizational initiatives intended to improve the efficiency, 
effectiveness, and consistency of work—such as improving product designs, reducing errors, and 
decreasing requirements for time, money, and other resources. Given constant pressure for better results in 
their organizations, PIPs are a fact of life for many managers in a variety of contexts, such as manufacturing, 
service operations, healthcare, and product development (PD) (Linderman et al. (2003); Schroeder et al. 
(2008); Zu et al. (2008)). Practitioners make substantial investments in PIPs (e.g., Lean, Six Sigma, Agile 
and Scrum) to transfer existing ones across national cultures (e.g., implementing Japanese manufacturing 
practices in US assembly plants) and functional or operational domains (e.g., applying Lean or Six Sigma 
in service operations, healthcare, and PD). Many claim that PIP principles and best practices are generic 
and thus transferable across contexts (Browning and Heath, 2009). 
Despite such claims, the desired benefits of PIPs are inconsistently realized in practice (Arlbjørn and 
Vagn Freytag, 2013; Hackman and Wageman, 1995; Hines et al., 2004; Jadhav et al., 2014; Repenning, 
2000; Staats et al., 2011; Swink and Jacobs, 2012; Victor et al., 2000). According to Netland (2016), two 
out of every three change initiatives do not achieve their desired results, only one in four manufacturing 
plants that employed Lean production in the US was satisfied with the results, and many organizations 
struggle to sustain momentum beyond initial implementation of their Lean practices. (Findings by Danese 
et al. (2017), that Lean requires similar efforts to sustain as it does to implement, echo the previous 
statement.) These findings highlight a non-trivial challenge for the operations management (OM) 
community. Numerous PIP practices exist with evidence that they (occasionally) work. Furthermore, 
managers are expected to implement those practices, under the premise that what worked in one place will 
bring the same positive results elsewhere. However, few have studied the question of how to reliably 
implement PIPs when the principles are applied in new contexts (an issue noted by Lillrank (1995) and 
explored by Staats et al. (2011)). 
This paper seeks to improve our understanding of such situations in three ways that are relevant to OM 
theory and practice. First, this paper addresses PIP implementation that is mandatory instead of voluntary. 
When a PIP is successfully implemented elsewhere, a manager may be expected to implement the same 
practices in their own organization. The priority is often for the manager to mobilize resources within his 
or her organization in order to comply with the imposed expectations (symbolic success). Such expectations 
often leave managers with limited flexibility for their employees to develop solutions that address their 
specific operational challenges and embed sustainably altered behaviors (substantive success). It is possible, 
as in the case of Six Sigma at 3M, for a mandatory PIP to evolve over time in ways that increase its 
substantive success (Canato and Ravasi, 2014; Canato et al., 2013). However, both scholars and 
practitioners should understand how to proactively evolve a mandatory PIP implementation. Improved 
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understanding of how these situations affect PIPs in practice is crucial for building sound theory (Handfield 
and Melnyk, 1998; Langley et al., 2013) and helping organizations to navigate the landscape of externally 
imposed mandates. 
Second, our understanding of what PIPs are exceeds our understanding of how to implement them (e.g., 
Anand et al., 2010; Black and Porter, 1996; Jones et al., 2010; Schroeder et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2011). 
In the presence of expectations to replicate PIP best practices that “worked there,” many organizations 
implement PIPs without substantively changing their employees’ underlying patterns of action: They 
espouse change without verifying that they have actually achieved it (Hackman and Wageman, 1995; 
Pentland and Feldman, 2008; Zbaracki, 1998). When this happens, they implement a PIP without a solid 
understanding of the causal paths from metrics to desired behavioral outcomes (Melnyk et al., 2010) or 
potential sources of variation as PIP practices diffuse into their organizations (Ansari et al., 2010). 
Third, OM researchers and practitioners must articulate the characteristics and underlying causal factors 
of a successful PIP across multiple contexts. This is important when organizations seek to expand on 
successful PIP experiences by replicating them elsewhere (Danese et al., 2017; Lillrank, 1995). Many 
organizations use PIPs to characterize and control technical knowledge (Bohn, 1994) across the entire 
product lifecycle, thus extending their scope upstream from standardized production to the innovation work 
of designing and developing new products and services (Browning and Sanders, 2012; Davenport et al., 
1996; McManus et al., 2007; Murman et al., 2002; Staats et al., 2011).  
We combine empirical evidence from a 24-month, in-depth, clinical research study (Schein, 1987, 
1993) at a PD company (DevCo) with multiple streams of literature—including process improvement, 
organizational change, and organizational behavior—to expand theory about transferring PIPs and 
sustaining their implementation. Our research was problem-solving-oriented (LaGanga, 2011; Lok and De 
Rond, 2013; Mathieu, 2016; Staats et al., 2011; Van Oorschot et al., 2013)  in that we examined part of 
DevCo’s “system health” (Schein, 1987:40) in terms of how effectively it implemented a PIP across the 11 
PD projects in its Engineering department.  DevCo’s PIP implementation experienced gaps between its 
symbolic and substantive success (Hackman and Wageman, 1995; Sousa and Voss, 2002, 2008) and thus 
failed to achieve the desired outcome of sustained implementation. By exploring DevCo’s PIP 
implementation in light of existing theory about organizational change, we contribute to OM theory 
(Ketokivi and Choi, 2014) about successfully transferring PIPs to new contexts.  
We explore relationships between (1) the priorities of the PIP’s steering committee (who defined its 
principles and practices) and DevCo’s senior leadership (who defined the change message) and (2) the 
dynamics of DevCo’s working-level engineers (who responded to the PIP). We identify three internal 
factors—conflicting environmental interpretations, inadequate PIP tools, and problematic metaphors—that 
reduced the efficacy of DevCo’s PIP implementation, thereby limiting the desired outcome of new, shared 
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beliefs and behaviors in the Engineering department. We also identify three negative factors— distant 
benefits, empty milestone compliance, and overreliance on grassroots adoption—that increased the gap 
between symbolic and substantive change. Finally, we identify two positive factors—flexible routines and 
tailored principles—that shift focus away from off-the-shelf practices (“It worked there, so do it here”) 
toward contextualization of underlying principles—thereby enhancing the flow of value-added information 
within a PD context and reducing the gap between symbolic and substantive change. We use our findings 
to develop eight propositions that reconceptualize existing OM and organizational change constructs 
(Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007) and guide both the research and practice of effective PIP 
implementation in new contexts such as PD. 
2 Background and Initial Framework 
2.1 Transferring PIPs to PD: Challenges of Context and Mandatory Implementation 
According to the “thesis of transference” (Womack et al., 1990), operations managers in diverse 
contexts share a common set of problems. Hence, they should also be able to share a common set of 
solutions to those problems. The assertion is that PIP principles and practices (e.g., Lean’s principles of 
specifying value, identifying the value stream, making value flow continuously, letting the customer pull 
value, and pursuing perfection (Womack and Jones, 2003) and Six Sigma’s problem-solving method, role 
structure, and use of specific metrics (Schroeder et al., 2008)) can be transferred across contexts to increase 
efficiency and effectiveness. Many consider PIPs to be generic enough to apply across the entire product 
lifecycle, encompassing both the knowledge work associated with developing new products and the 
production work associated with manufacturing and supporting them in service (e.g., McManus et al., 2007; 
Oppenheim, 2004). 
PIPs are part of the broader area of management innovation, which introduces new practices, processes, 
or structures to further organizational goals (Volberda et al., 2014). PIP transfer is the adoption of external 
practices, which may be adapted for the specific context or expected to work “off the shelf.” The transfer 
takes place within a specific organizational power structure. A successful PIP implementation can create 
expectations that the same practices will work again, elsewhere (Canato and Ravasi, 2014; Canato et al., 
2013; Danese et al., 2017; Lillrank, 1995). Hence, managers are often directed to implement specific 
practices by prescribed deadlines with expectations of success. These expectations limit managers’ 
flexibility to allow their employees to contextualize solutions for specific situations and challenges. Rather, 
managers must mobilize resources within their organization to comply with the imposed expectations. 
Transferability, while appealing in principle, has proven to be challenging in practice. The OM 
literature reports many successful implementations of PIP principles in various contexts, but also reasons 
why different contexts challenge some of the basic assumptions of those PIP principles in ways that 
compromise effective implementation (Danese et al., 2017; Groop et al., 2017; Lillrank, 2003; Szulanski, 
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1996, 2000; Yin et al., 2017). For example, Lean gained a foothold in American manufacturing companies 
only after data emerged to demonstrate that American companies could implement practices previously 
considered unique to Japanese culture (Holweg, 2007). Yet, reliable transferability of PIPs is open to 
question, especially in the context of more novel and complex project work such as PD, where the point is 
to design something new, once—not reproduce it repeatedly (Browning, 2003; Browning and Sanders, 
2012). The inputs, transformations, and outputs (i.e., activities and processes) associated with PD activities 
involve acquiring, processing, and transferring new information and knowledge (Browning and Heath, 
2009).  
This “knowledge work” context poses several differences for PIP implementation in comparison to 
manufacturing contexts (Browning et al., 2006; Staats et al., 2011). First, the PD context is more uncertain 
and unstable. Often, customers cannot perfectly define their requirements and preferences (sources of value) 
before PD begins. Organizations must forecast requirements and interact with their customers frequently to 
define their work correctly. This may happen amid changes to their product and process technologies and 
external environment. Second, PD activities have higher degrees of uncertainty. The partial visibility of 
relationships among activities often limits a worker’s ability to identify and resolve emerging problems. PD 
process variability is high:  It is often possible to perform various activities without all of their ideal inputs 
by using assumptions instead. Whereas activities such as testing and rework are considered waste in 
traditional lean implementations, they can add value to PD efforts by reducing uncertainty and risks to value 
(Browning, 2003). Third, the high-level product architecture evolves as requirements, technological 
capabilities, and external environment all become better defined. This means that PD activities are 
conducted amidst high levels of architectural ambiguity. It is akin to repeatedly executing individual 
manufacturing processes while simultaneously redesigning the assembly process. 
These characteristics of information flow in PD contexts have been identified in the OM literature, 
leading to new approaches for framing and tailoring project management for PD contexts (e.g., 
Chandrasekaran et al., 2015; Pich et al., 2002). They remain a contextual challenge for PIP transferability 
that has not been well explored. Organizations seeking to transfer PIP principles to PD contexts must 
reconceptualize key variables such as waste and value so that the design management activities in PD can 
be effectively targeted for process improvement (Ahire and Dreyfus, 2000; Browning, 2003; Lillrank, 
1995). The application of PIP tools to PD must amplify creativity in high-uncertainty conditions by 
enhancing the flow of value-adding information (Eidt, 1992; Spain, 1996) and the execution of business 
strategies intended to encourage innovation (Adler et al., 2009; Browning and Sanders, 2012; Choo et al., 
2007; Johnson and Swisher, 2003). Thus, while problems of waste and productivity exist in all operational 
contexts, it is not yet clear how to sustainably implement PIP principles in ways that address the challenges 
of improving knowledge-embedding processes and contextually dependent problem-solving techniques 
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(instead of abstract rules). In this paper, we explore one firm’s attempt to transfer a PIP from a production 
context to PD, observing details of implementation to contribute to the “roadmap for knowledge-based 
industries seeking to apply the same ideas” (Staats et al., 2011). 
2.2 Transferring PIPs to PD: The Challenge of Achieving Substantive Change 
PIPs are process innovations (Damanpour, 2001) that introduce new elements into an organization’s 
operations by enabling employees to continuously improve their activities. PIPs are thus expected to cause 
cultural changes. However, limited research exists to understand the actual process by which PIPs create  
behavioral changes (e.g., Birkinshaw et al., 2008; Volberda et al., 2014). Indeed, the scholarly literature 
suggests that many firms implement PIPs without substantively changing their employees’ underlying 
patterns of action (Hackman and Wageman, 1995; Pentland and Feldman, 2008; Zbaracki, 1998). Both 
scholars and practitioners frequently cite human behavior as a primary reason that PIPs fail to achieve their 
intended results (Baba, 1995; Dahlgaard and Dahlgaard-Park, 2006; Hackman and Wageman, 1995; Liker 
et al., 1999; Linderman et al., 2004; Zu et al., 2009). For example, Beer (2003) attributed Total Quality 
Management (TQM) failures to poor implementation (top management did not exhibit the behaviors 
required to create the culture change that would enable sustained benefits from the TQM initiative) rather 
than flaws in the underlying theory or method. Bhakoo and Choi (2013) noted that implementation of 
interorganizational systems across healthcare supply chains can be ceremonially successful without 
impacting the technical core of an organization. As such, a key aspect of PIP effectiveness depends on the 
human behavior that develops in response to their implementation. 
Substantively changing underlying behavior patterns presents an organizational challenge for 
implementing PIPs, especially in PD environments. It is known that (a) introducing a PIP requires non-
trivial changes in organizational operations, and (b) a lack of change will hinder or halt effective PIP 
implementation in a known context such as manufacturing (Browning and Heath, 2009; Holweg, 2007). It 
is not yet known how organizations seeking to implement PIPs can most effectively garner support from 
diverse individuals and social systems to drive and sustain the PIP’s associated beliefs and behaviors 
(Henderson et al., 1998; Kull et al., 2012; Zmud, 1984). 
2.3 Initial Framework: PIP Implementation as Organizational Change 
As stated in the Introduction, scholarly understanding of how to implement PIPs lags the description of 
what they are. In recent years, research on PIP implementation has progressed in two areas. The first area 
concerns the behavioral challenges associated with PIP implementation in production environments (e.g., 
Furterera and Elshennawy, 2005; Naor et al., 2008; Pisani et al., 2009) and the coordination of PIP practices 
and tools with supporting infrastructure to change organizational routines (Linderman et al., 2010). The 
second area concerns how to define characteristics of PIPs in new contexts. Beyond simply stating that PIP 
principles are transferrable, this stream seeks to rearticulate PIP principles for new contexts (e.g., Browning, 
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2003; Browning and Heath, 2009; Poppendieck and Poppendieck, 2003). These two areas of research have 
improved our understanding about (1) how to implement PIPs in ways that increase substantive change in 
contexts where PIP applications already have a mature history and (2) how to reconceptualize PIP principles 
in new contexts, respectively. Yet, only limited research (e.g., Lillrank, 1995; Staats et al., 2011) has 
addressed both areas at once, as this paper does. 
Following Armenakis and colleagues (Armenakis and Harris, 2002; Rafferty et al., 2012), we draw 
upon Lewin’s (1951) three-phase change sequence of unfreezing (readiness), changing (adoption), and 
refreezing (institutionalization) to suggest a framework for addressing this challenge. Lewin’s sequence 
serves as both an explicit and tacit framework for contemporary research on organizational change—e.g., 
leading change (Kotter, 1996), dealing with middle managers (Huy, 2001), issue-selling (Dutton et al., 
2001), grassroots change (Frohman, 1997), and ensuring that changes address the right problem (e.g., 
Kilmann and Mitroff, 1979). In addition to providing a framework for change implementation, the sequence 
also emphasizes the need to understand the interaction between the change message, the organization being 
changed, and the organization’s environment (e.g., Jiao and Zhao, 2014). This acknowledges the challenge 
of transferability (although Lewin and others did not use the term explicitly). Hence we suggest that Lewin’s 
sequence is helpful for understanding the implementation of PIPs in unconventional contexts such as PD. 
In this paper, we use it to examine PIP implementation as a type of organizational change. 
Our initial framework operationalizes an effective organizational change as one that progresses through 
all three of Lewin’s phases (recognizing that actual progression through the phases is interactive and not as 
linear as described here), whereas not doing so will reduce the change’s effectiveness. We do not define 
PIP effectiveness based on meeting organizational milestones, because, as stated in Section 1, symbolic 
success does not verify substantive underlying change. Also, although it would be useful to do so in future 
research, we do not define PIP effectiveness in terms of time or money, because many confounding factors 
can affect these results. For example, PD managers could attain short-term efficiency gains by simply 
eliminating activities, which could compromise long-term effectiveness. Instead, drawing from work by 
Schein (1996) and Armenakis and colleagues (Armenakis and Harris, 2002; Armenakis et al., 1993), we 
assess effective PIP implementation based on the presence of behavioral characteristics that impact the 
efficacy of each phase in Lewin’s sequence.  We relate each phase in Lewin’s sequence to existing theory 
and deeper principles that guide and evaluate change implementations. 
Lewin’s first phase, unfreezing, creates readiness to change by reducing the strength of forces that 
maintain the status quo and increasing the strength of forces for change. This occurs by creating urgency 
(confirming that the organization accepts the need for a change) and communicating a clear discrepancy 
between the current condition and the desired future state. This phase is where PIP principles are articulated 
for the new context (e.g., PD) in a manner that demonstrates the value of adopting them. Lewin’s second 
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phase, change, involves actually adopting new ways of working. This requires demonstrating that the 
change is an appropriate solution to the problem identified during the unfreezing phase. According to 
Armenakis and Harris (2002), this is a trial phase after which employees may still choose to reject the 
proposed change. The third phase, refreezing, is needed to institutionalize the change and ensure that the 
forces are sufficiently strong to maintain the new status quo. This requires providing necessary resources 
(training, personnel, and funding) to support the change effort and demonstrating direct benefits0F1 for 
individuals who adopt the change. In terms of PIP implementation, this last phase is where the PIP’s 
principles are embedded in the new context (e.g., PD) and ensured to be sustainable. Overall, we sought to 
explore each of these aspects in relation to the effectiveness of PIP implementation. 
3 Research Setting and Methods 
We collected data over 24 months in 2005-06 as part of a larger, mixed-methods ethnographic study 
(Handwerker, 2001), examining expertise and process control in DevCo’s Engineering department (Collins, 
2009; Collins et al., 2010; Collins et al., 2009). Our interest in transferring PIP principles from 
manufacturing to PD contexts, with the associated burden of organizational change, led us to adopt a clinical 
study methodology (e.g., Barley and Kunda, 2001; Coghlan, 2009; Howard-Grenville, 2005; Schein, 1987, 
1993) that sought to understand how the PIP conceptualized improvement relative to daily practices at 
DevCo and how the PIP implementation was managed as an organizational change initiative. Clinical 
research is well positioned to study these issues because it captures the operation of power and authority, 
the role of “perceptual defenses,” the interactions and linkages of “forces across hierarchical boundaries,” 
and the dynamic nature of those forces as the situation changes (Schein, 1993:705). These data identify 
psychological defenses and cultural assumptions that “do not reveal themselves easily to uninvolved 
observers, surveyors, testers, or experimenters” (Schein, 1993) and that are often identified as contributing 
to the unsuccessful implementation of PIPs (e.g., Beer, 2003). DevCo’s PIP implementation was a case in 
which such processes were “transparently observable” (Eisenhardt, 1989) and “contextually rich” (Bhakoo 
and Choi, 2013). The in-depth observations across organizational power levels allowed for the uncovering 
of phenomena pertaining to the transfer of PIPs to PD contexts.  This enabled us to observe and describe 
complicated research phenomena in ways that increased our understanding of the landscape (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007; Handfield and Melnyk, 1998; McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993; Meredith, 1998) and 
                                                     
 
 
1 (Armenakis et al., 1999) used the construct of (personal) valence to explain that individuals will weigh the costs and 
benefits of adopting a change. Instead, we use the term direct benefit in this paper, because re-freezing requires the 
cost / benefit analysis to conclude in favor of benefit in the case of each involved individual. 
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to exercise “controlled opportunism” (Eisenhardt, 1989) to explore emergent paths of inquiry. 
Rather than focus on completed PIPs (and thus only retrospective data), we used a longitudinal 
approach that examined DevCo’s experience as it occurred. We sought a rich understanding of experiences 
at the working level of PD engineers and managers (Adler and Clark, 1991; Bhakoo and Choi, 2013). Since 
our research time frame coincided with the PIP implementation, we had no preconceived notions about the 
outcomes. Moreover, studying the PIP implementation in “real time” limited bias from hindsight or recall 
(Staats et al., 2011; Van Oorschot et al., 2013). As an inductive study (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Langley, 
1999; Langley et al., 2013), our findings emerged through an iterative process wherein we repeatedly 
compared our data (from varied sources within DevCo, as described below) with concepts from different 
streams of literature about PIP implementation and organizational change (Van de Ven, 2007; Van Oorschot 
et al., 2013). Our basic steps were to (a) identify the initial frameworks that would guide our research, (b) 
observe the processes of stability and change as DevCo initially implemented the PIP, (c) sort the data into 
meaningful categories, (d) ground our observations with existing literature to develop propositions that 
established the theoretical relevance of our findings, (e) corroborate our propositions with further 
observations of DevCo’s PIP implementation, and (f) re-ground our observations and refine the 
propositions. The following subsections further describe the research setting and our data collection and 
analysis activities. 
3.1 Research Setting 
DevCo is a division (800 employees) of a multinational corporation (MultiNat) with a large presence 
in several research, technology, and manufacturing industries. At the time of our research, MultiNat’s 
annual report identified a workforce of over 200,000 employees, $50 billion revenue, and $4 billion profit. 
In the decade prior to our research, DevCo invested heavily to expand its product offerings for the power 
generation industry. Its product offerings focused on field prototype and limited fleet (< 100 units), which 
had the dual purpose of maturing DevCo’s core technology and growing the renewable energy industry. 
DevCo’s  structure for its Engineering Department consisted of four groups. The Advanced Technology 
group was responsible for developing new technology within DevCo’s portfolio. The Product Development 
group was responsible for developing product offerings using DevCo’s technology. The Experimental Test 
group was responsible for verification and validation testing of configurations developed by both the 
Advanced Technology and Product Development groups. The Engineering Management Group (EMG) was 
responsible for defining processes and procedures to guide the work of the other three groups (including 
PIP implementation). 
DevCo’s investment spanned several cycles of personnel expansion and contraction that resulted from 
changes in its target markets. In 2004 (the year before we began our research) DevCo cancelled three high-
profile development programs (because its technology was less mature than anticipated), lost contract bids 
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with several potential customers (part of an industry trend where DevCo and its competitors all faced a 
weakened market), and reduced its workforce of 300 engineers by over 30%. This downturn put DevCo’s 
leadership team under considerable cost and schedule pressure, from both its customers and MultiNat, and 
accentuated the need to avoid mistakes in product launch decisions. In response, DevCo adjusted its 
portfolio to the new market conditions and emphasized controlling its PD activities. One mechanism for 
this control was implementation of MultiNat’s PIP, a fusion of Lean and Six Sigma, to improve its PD 
processes (i.e., to improve competitiveness following the downturn, increase sales, and speed recovery by 
reducing the non-recurring cost of PD and the recurring costs of products that were complex to 
manufacture). 
Table 1: Elements and heritage of MultiNat’s PIP 
PIP Element Source  
Process Improvement / Waste Elimination 
5S (sort, straighten, sweep, standardize, and self-discipline) 
Lean 
Value stream management 
Standardized operating procedures; standard work 
Production process reengineering 
Total preventive maintenance 
Set-up reduction 
Process management & control 
Six Sigma Process definition 
Problem Solving & Decision-Making 
Voice of the customer Six Sigma and TQM Quality data and reporting 
Root cause analysis (five whys) Lean Mistake-proofing 
Stage-gate control for product introduction activities (Cooper et al., 2002; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 
1993) 
Supporting Infrastructure (Operating System) 
Top management commitment 
Training for quality 
Employee involvement and teamwork (workforce management) 
Role structure with improvement specialists and coaches 
Six Sigma and TQM 
 
The PIP originated as a set of grassroots, manufacturing quality improvement tools at another MultiNat 
division. At its core, the PIP intended to help groups measure their activities, identify problems, define 
ways to improve, and avoid repeating past mistakes. It aimed to accomplish this by using the elements in 
Table 1 to promote data-driven problem solving, decision making, and waste elimination. (Lean, Six Sigma, 
and Total Quality Management [TQM] elements are classified using the taxonomies proposed by Browning 
and Heath, 2009.; Schroeder et al., 2008; Zu et al., 2008). 
Following its initial success, and assuming it was transferrable, Multinat expanded the PIP into a 
formalized structure containing common requirements for both manufacturing and office environments 
across all its divisions. MultiNat established a steering committee comprised of employees from each 
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division, whose responsibility was to manage deployment of the PIP across the company. The committee 
defined four phases of PIP implementation: Qualifying (awareness of the PIP), Bronze (demonstrated 
competence with PIP tools and methods), Silver (demonstrated process control and improvement using the 
PIP tools and methods), and Gold (“world-class performance”). Each phase included required changes (e.g., 
improved processes or utilized tools) and criteria for progression to the next. By the Gold phase, the 
organization was expected to provide products and services of sufficiently high quality to motivate 
customers not to do business elsewhere. 
Table 2: DevCo Product Lines and PIP Research Scope 
 
In 2004 MultiNat initiated a large-scale certification effort at all of its divisions. This effort increased 
the uniformity of PIP implementation and assessment by imposing a single set of requirements and 
certification criteria, defined centrally by MultiNat. Due to the scope of the PIP revision, DevCo and other 
divisions that previously achieved Bronze had to be recertified. (DevCo completed its Bronze recertification 
in 2004.) DevCo treated the Silver Certification as a case of implementing the PIP for the first time. 
(MultiNat’s PIP steering committee shared this view.) The PIP deployment across DevCo’s entire business 
unit encompassed its Business Development, Support (e.g., Legal and Human Resources), Engineering, 
Operations, and Supply Chain departments. Our unit of analysis was the PIP implementation in DevCo’s 
Engineering Department as it supported the development efforts for two separate markets (six products in 
one market, five in another)—see Table 2. DevCo’s cross-functional teams on each product line included 
personnel from the rest of the business unit. Our research focused on the effect of the PIP implementation 
on enabling the engineering staff on those teams to more effectively do their work. 
DevCo served as a representative case for the phenomena of theoretical interest identified by the two 
challenges in Section 2: articulating PIP principles in PD (the contextual challenge) and planning and 
managing the behavior changes for successful PIP implementation (the organizational challenge). Although 
R&D PD
Product 1 Discontinued
Product 2 Cancelled
Product 3 Continued
Product 4 Continued
Product 5 Launched
Product 6 Launched
Product 7 Cancelled
Product 8 Cancelled
Product 9 Cancelled & 
Relaunched
Product 10 Continued
Product 11 Launched
Business 
Development
Operations / 
Manufacturing
Additional 
Research focus 
for Gold 
Planning Stage
Product Line Activity
Supply Chain
Department at DevCo
Research focus 
for Silver 
Planning & 
Implementation 
Stages
Market 
Segment #1
Market 
Segment #2
EngineeringSupport 
(HR / Legal)
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the company had previously implemented several tools to make its PD activities more effective1F2, the PIP 
was the only active initiative being used to improve operational efficiency and effectiveness at the time of 
our research. As DevCo did not significantly change its technology or product offerings during the period 
of our research, these variables were also essentially held constant. The emphasis on the PIP allowed our 
study to focus on the variables of interest relative to the contextual and organizational challenges of 
implementation. 
3.2 Data Collection 
Our 24-month study at DevCo involved the three phases shown in Table 3: Silver Planning, Silver 
Implementation, and Gold Planning. The first author was a full-time (>40 hours per week) employee in the 
six-person Engineering Management Group (EMG). Along with another EMG member, he shared 
responsibility for defining and executing the PIP implementation strategy within DevCo’s Engineering 
department. This immersive participation at DevCo enabled us to “uncover real ‘unwritten-rules-of-the 
game’ in a manner that [enabled] diagnosis and sometimes change and improvement” (Suckley and Price, 
2013:174). It provided us with data about motivations for what the leadership at MultiNat and DevCo 
wanted the PIP to accomplish, as well as  consequences of the PIP implementation based on responses from 
mid-level managers and working-level engineers. (Schein (1987) referred to these as back-stage and front-
stage dynamics of organizations, respectively.) The first author’s role enabled us to collect data oriented 
towards a clinical view of the PIP implementation—what DevCo learned during the Silver Certification 
efforts, intended and unintended consequences of that effort, and how it could more effectively encourage 
adoption of PIP tools and methods during the Gold Certification. The revealed data provided improved 
understanding of DevCo’s dynamics—providing building blocks for both improved theory (Schein, 
1987:55) and increased practical relevance (Holmstrom et al., 2009). 
Our primary sources of data were company communications, meetings, and semi-structured interviews, 
as summarized in Table 4. Each meeting included two to fifteen participants. We used semi-structured 
interviews during both individual discussions and meetings. Overall, we interviewed over 80 people. We 
recorded data through a combination of ethnographic field notes (Emerson et al., 1995) and meeting 
minutes. DevCo’s security policy prohibited video or voice recording devices. Physically participating in 
meetings and discussions enabled us to capture non-verbal cues such as posture and tone of voice, which 
                                                     
 
 
2 These tools included concurrent engineering (CE), quality function deployment (QFD), integrated product 
development (IPD), and design for manufacturing and assembly (DFMA) ((e.g., Boothroyd et al., 1994; Chen et al., 
2010; Clausing, 1994; Hjort et al., 1991; Roemer and Ahmadi, 2010; Sobek II et al., 1999)). It is outside the scope of 
this paper to discuss whether these tools achieved sustainable results at DevCo. As a mandatory change, the PIP 
emphasized implementing the tools in Table 1 in a manner that was largely agnostic to these previous efforts. 
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aided in understanding and interpreting our collected data. We were able to observe “anomalies, blank 
looks, … and various other kinds of emotional responses” (Schein, 1987:39) to better understand reactions 
to the PIP. 
Table 3: PIP Phases and Associated Research Emphasis 
PIP Phase Clinical Research Focus 
Silver Planning 
(Jan – Jun 2005) 
• Preparations taking place prior to launching the Silver Implementation phase for the Engineering 
department 
• Understanding required manpower and determining how to adapt the PIP resources and assessment 
material for use at DevCo 
Silver 
Implementation 
(Jun 2005 – Jun 
2006)  
• Conducting tactical planning to discuss the health of the certification effort and any changes in 
approach, and working with PIP staff to conduct the actual certification assessments 
• Discussing execution of the Silver certification, understanding questions about implementing the PIP at 
DevCo, preparing material for the Silver assessment, and obtaining feedback on the perceived benefits 
(or lack thereof) from the PIP 
• Observing the PIP material presented in training sessions and division all-hands meetings 
• Explaining the PIP elements and the intent of the Engineering Management Group (EMG) for adapting 
them at DevCo, and discussing areas of confusion, clarity, and perceived relevance 
• Coordinating where multiple improvement teams (either within Engineering or between Engineering 
and Operations) sought credit for improvement during the Silver assessment 
• Ensuring that, as downstream “customers” whose feedback was required during the assessment, any 
day-to-day operational issues where Engineering contributed to waste in Operations departments were 
addressed 
Gold Planning 
(Jul 2006 – Dec 
2006) 
• Defining strategy to incorporate lessons learned from the Silver Implementation phase into the planning 
for the Gold certification efforts 
• Addressing criteria that the engineering teams and to improving alignment and collaboration in process 
improvement activities between the Engineering and Operations departments. 
• Defining strategy for developing joint Engineering/Operations improvement activities in support of the 
Gold certification 
 
Table 4: Data Sources 
Data Source Summary 
Meetings • Weekly Engineering Management Group (EMG) meeting, which included the PIP as an agenda item 
• Recurring (weekly or bi-weekly) meetings regarding the Silver Certification held by functional 
managers in the Engineering department 
• Recurring (weekly) meetings with teams responsible for collecting data for the Silver Certification 
Communications • Mandatory 1-2 hour training sessions on the PIP that DevCo held for the Engineering department 
• PIP presentation materials from DevCo’s all-hands meetings (attended by all employees) 
Semi-structured 
Interviews 
• Interviews with working-level engineers assigned to the different Engineering teams that prepared 
materials for the Silver Certification 
• Interviews with managers in the Operations department, who were also going through the PIP 
implementation and assessment 
• Online interviews about the PIP with participants in MultiNat’s employee scholar program who held 
similar responsibilities at other MultiNat divisions within their Engineering, Finance, and Operations 
departments 
 
During each PIP implementation phase, we organized our questions to probe whether our informants 
identified themes related to our initial framework in section 2.3 (see the sample set in Table 5). During 
these interviews, we approached DevCo’s employees as both objects of study and expert witnesses (Levy 
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and Hollan, 1998). As objects of study, our questions probed their personal experiences with the Silver 
certification. As expert witnesses, our questions probed their knowledge of DevCo’s culture and behavior 
as it pertained to the PIP. Both sets of responses provided data to evaluate the Silver certification efforts 
against our initial framework in Section 2, with a view toward improving DevCo’s PIP implementation 
efforts during the Gold certification phase. 
 
Table 5: Sample Interview Questions 
• Which specific elements of the PIP do you find confusing? 
• In your daily activities, are there activities or dynamics that you view as taking up lots of time without providing much 
value (churn)? 
• Is the PIP data collection capturing any of these activities? 
• What activities are you being asked to complete for the PIP? 
• Do you think that any of the activities the PIP requires are “not real engineering work”? 
• What do you think quality means in a PD context like this? 
• Do you think that process improvement and innovation are mutually exclusive? 
• What do you think should be done to reduce the types of problems that are attributed to causing the recent program 
cancellations? 
• Do you think interventions like the PIP are improving quality or addressing these problems? 
• What do you think should be done to make the PIP more effective at DevCo? 
 
Because we wanted to gain a deeper understanding of the PIP at DevCo from a specific informant 
population (working-level engineers and mid-level managers), we treated our data as a non-probabilistic 
“judgment sample” (Bernard, 2002). We looked for data saturation, the points where converging lines of 
inquiry (Guest et al., 2006; Levy and Hollan, 1998; Yin, 2003) identified empirical themes, which we 
compared with our initial framework. We also seized opportunities to pursue new directions based on our 
informants’ feedback. For example, when we asked one manager about quality and innovation being 
contradictory, he replied: 
I don’t think they are contradictory. I think they are orthogonal. For my team to innovate more 
effectively, they need to share information with each other. Using the PIP to improve quality control 
doesn’t address that need. I’m not interested in writing down processes to micromanage how they 
share information by forcing them to talk to specific experts. I accept some inefficiency in 
information sharing as part of working with new technology. 
This statement contained several themes from the input conditions in section 2.3, including the 
manager’s view of valued work (the team should innovate more effectively), lack of a discrepancy (he 
viewed the PIP’s documentation requirements as micromanaging how information was shared, which he 
did not consider useful), and limited appropriateness or direct benefit (the manager was skeptical that the 
PIP would improve his team’s performance). 
3.3 Data Analysis 
Similar to other longitudinal studies of organizational change (Lok and De Rond, 2013; Rerup and 
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Feldman, 2011; Van Oorschot et al., 2013), we grounded the descriptive observations from our data with 
theoretical elements from section 2.3 that provided a selective focus for observing change. Consistent with 
Yin (2003), Stuart et al. (2002), and Ketokivi and Choi (2014), we elaborate theory about transferring PIPs 
to PD contexts by comparing empirical evidence from each PIP phase with existing theories of 
organizational change. This synthesis is advocated by grounded theory research (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007), for which single case studies can be useful (Barratt et al., 2011; Browning and Heath, 2009; Flynn 
et al., 1990; March et al., 1991). 
Human creativity and intuition, not just data, are essential for developing theory (Mintzberg, 1979), so 
we needed a “creative leap” (Langley, 1999: 691) while at the same time remaining grounded in the data. 
Our approach was therefore three-fold. First, we used our field notes, interview transcripts, and relevant 
documents to build a database of observations that helped us understand the PIP implementation at DevCo. 
Because of our interest in PIP transferability between OM contexts, we sought to understand how well the 
PIP’s principles were understood at DevCo (with respect to both intended and unintended consequences of 
the PIP implementation). We organized the data into categories that represented the articulation of 
principles like value and waste in the PIP design and how DevCo’s engineers experienced them. Through 
this approach, we were able to use our data to identify a breadth of themes rather than merely count which 
ones were at the forefront of our informants’ minds. 
Second, we evaluated data within and between each PIP phase (Silver planning, Silver implementation, 
and Gold planning) to identify emerging themes, compare them with our initial framework (Ayres et al., 
2003; Rerup and Feldman, 2011), and ensure that our findings were not derived from a single phase. We 
examined the data for commonalities and variation across the experience of our informants (q.v., the data 
saturation and new ideas noted in Section 3.2). Our analysis within the Silver planning and implementation 
phases yielded distinct themes pertaining to motives for the implementation (what MultiNat and DevCo’s 
leadership wanted the PIP to accomplish), consequences of the implementation (how DevCo’s engineers 
experienced the PIP), and different interpretations about the expected versus achieved outcomes from the 
Silver Implementation. Our analysis between the Silver implementation and Gold planning phases yielded 
themes about the PIP as an initiative that could add value for DevCo as a PD company. We grounded our 
analysis of these observations in existing literature about PIP design, PIP transference between OM 
contexts, and organizational change. This led us to organize our emerging themes to examine whether the 
change at DevCo from the PIP Silver certification was indeed substantive (i.e., the PIP was widely “used 
and understood” (Zbaracki, 1998: 632)) or merely symbolic (i.e., DevCo just created the requisite artifacts 
to gain the PIP certifications by the declared milestones). We used these insights to develop theoretical 
propositions that summarized the themes from our findings.  
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Third, we analyzed the data from two complementary perspectives. The first author used his ethno-
graphically “thick” understanding of DevCo’s practices to ground the descriptive, clinical observations with 
core themes in the existing literature. The second author critically reviewed the observations against 
alternative explanations to improve the quality of our theoretical findings (Rerup and Feldman, 2011). By 
exploring our data from both perspectives, we (1) identified key issues, variables, relationships, and patterns 
in the data, with a specific view towards examining patterns that enhanced or ran counter to established 
theory, (2) proposed key factors and relationships to identify gaps between the data and existing theory, 
and to explain how and why they matter (Handfield and Melnyk, 1998), (3) eliminated initial propositions 
that lacked sufficient evidence or theoretical connection, and (4) strengthened the remaining propositions 
to ensure they integrated into an overall framework instead of expressing individual themes (Ayres et al., 
2003). In the end, we achieved a substantial but imperfect match between our propositions and our case 
study data. This was expected, since a set of independent variables does not explain 100% of the variation 
in a set of dependent variables (Mintzberg, 1979), even in quantitative research. Like Sutton and Callahan 
(1987), we accepted a good rather than a perfect fit between theory and data. 
To control for construct validity and reduce the risk of sensemaking bias, we conducted additional 
interviews to cross-check emerging themes and propositions with input from diverse functional areas, 
outside our target population. (Beyond working-level engineers and mid-level managers from the four 
Engineering groups at DevCo, our informants included senior and mid-level managers in Operations, mid-
level managers from MultiNat’s PIP steering committee, and working-level employees responsible for 
implementing the PIP at other MultiNat divisions.) We triangulated findings from our interviews through 
a review of PIP policy documents from MultiNat’s central office and participation in monthly steering 
committee meetings for individuals responsible for PIP strategy and deployment in each MultiNat division. 
This provided “substantive coverage” (Kunda et al., 2002) for our findings, which increased confidence in 
their internal validity. 
To further ensure correct documentation and interpretation of events, the first author wrote an internal 
report at the end of the Silver Implementation phase that summarized the PIP status for DevCo’s 
Engineering department (including lessons learned from the Silver Implementation phase and 
recommendations for the Gold Planning phase). He revised the initial report based on reviews by the four 
individuals responsible for the PIP’s implementation in DevCo’s Engineering department. He also 
interviewed six Engineering managers to discuss the completion of the Silver assessment, understand ways 
to improve the facilitation provided by the EMG, and identify improvements that the Silver Implementation 
did not address. These ten validation interviews were with individuals who were also informants during the 
earlier data gathering. The diminishing number of feedback items through these review cycles provided a 
reasonable basis for accepting our refined data and analysis as reliable and valid. 
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4 Findings from DevCo’s PIP Implementation 
4.1 Assessing Symbolic Success: The Audit and Its Results 
In 2003, DevCo’s president declared two milestones for the PIP implementation: Bronze recertification 
by December 2004 and Silver by June 2006. Achieving Bronze certification required only demonstrating 
awareness of key principles from the PIP (e.g., customer satisfaction, process control), while achieving 
Silver certification required demonstrating that these principles were being adopted. The day-to-day 
execution of DevCo’s PD routines was expected to change in line with this adoption. The mechanism to 
assess this adoption was the Silver Audit, which took place between April and June of 2006. Managers and 
teams from the Engineering department presented evidence of how they met the Silver requirements during 
weekly meetings with two auditors (both employed by DevCo). They organized the evidence in a 
spreadsheet report that listed each PIP item, its requirements, expectations of what should be presented to 
satisfy the requirements, and specific links supporting compliance data. The full audit table decomposed 
each of the categories from Table 1 into over one hundred items. Table 6 summarizes some examples. 
4.2 Assessing Substantive Success: PIP Implementation “As Expected” versus “As Experienced” 
The Engineering department produced adequate evidence to convince the auditors that it had satisfied 
MultiNat’s criteria for the Silver certification before the declared June 2006 deadline. Thus, by its own 
criteria, DevCo achieved symbolic success. However, as stated in Section 1, an organization may achieve 
symbolic success without substantive change actually occurring. MultiNat’s PIP architects anticipated this 
possibility, as their review of the PIP implementation at several MultiNat locations in 2004 had shown 
consistency at the Bronze and Gold levels but considerable variation at the Silver level (variation in the 
sense that some sites had achieved Silver without demonstrating all of the architects’ anticipated outcomes). 
This variation helped motivate them to revise the PIP rules and launch the recertification effort mentioned 
in Section 3.1. Hence, we wondered whether DevCo’s symbolic success with the Silver certification also 
included substantive changes to its PD practices. To explore this question, we organized our findings in 
further detail according to the framework in Section 2.3, which claims that an effectively implemented PIP 
will progress through Lewin’s three stages of unfreezing, changing, and re-freezing. We specifically 
examined the relationships between how MultiNat and DevCo crafted the change message and how 
DevCo’s engineers experienced the PIP. 
Table 6: Summary of Silver Audit Data 
PIP Item 
PIP 
Requirement 
(from MultiNat) 
PIP Compliance Criterion 
(from DevCo’s PIP 
Auditors) 
DevCo’s Compliance Activity 
(presented during the audit) 
Process Improvement / Waste Elimination 
Value stream 
management & 
process re-
Value stream map 
(VSM) exists for 
area being audited 
VSM used to identify key 
deliverables, downstream 
customers, and points in the 
Argued VSM was not the proper tool for PD 
 
Showed processes mapped via design 
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engineering value stream requiring process 
control / definition 
Kaizen events implemented to 
improve processes based on 
VSM results 
structure matrix (DSM) instead 
Process definition & 
standard work 
Key processes 
identified and 
defined 
Demonstrate rationale for 
selecting key processes & show 
they are under control (above) 
and defined (standard work) 
Displayed engineering processes using the 
organization of the PIP tool 
 
Showed list of processes with governing work 
documents for each engineering function 
(e.g., software, systems engineering, 
mechanical and electrical design) 
Total preventive 
maintenance TPM in place 
No requirement for Silver, but 
criteria existed for Gold 
Presented plan to ensure that IT infrastructure 
was in place, software licenses, lab 
equipment, etc. 
Problem Solving & Decision-Making 
Voice of the 
customer 
Customer 
satisfaction survey 
Average score at least 4 out of 
5 with action plans in place to 
improve low scores 
Provided list of internal customers queried for 
the survey, with results showing average 
score was at least 4 out of 5. 
Mistake-proofing 
Mistake-proofing 
used to improve 
processes 
Example of mistake-proofing 
being applied 
Presented an example from development 
program of errors identified and steps taken 
to correct them. The auditor accepted the 
evidence and said that the corrections would 
need to be applied to DevCo’s other programs 
for the Gold audit. 
Supporting Infrastructure (Operating System) 
Top management 
commitment 
Leadership supports 
PIP  
Showed that Engineering teams were formed 
to collect data for each section of the audit 
spreadsheet, and that a manager was assigned 
to lead each PIP team 
Employee 
involvement and 
teamwork (workforce 
management) 
Cultural alignment 
(workforce supports 
PIP) 
 Showed that 100% of engineers assigned to participate on a PIP team 
 
4.2.1 Months 1 – 6: Unfreezing with the PIP 
DevCo’s PIP implementation coincided with the market downturn and commercial pressure discussed 
in Section 3.2. As researchers, we interpreted these environmental factors as potential unfreezing forces to 
motivate a change in DevCo’s status quo. Our informants indicated that they viewed the environmental 
factors differently.  
I have been through several downturns like this during my career at DevCo. I learned to make sure 
my resume was always up to date, because I didn’t know if the company would fold or not. What 
we are going through right now is not much different. [Experienced engineer] 
This whole idea of external feedback that the PIP emphasizes is tricky at DevCo. In emerging 
markets, you often need to convince customers to buy your product. It’s tough to convince someone 
who operates with that mindset to use feedback as an infallible guide to what you should do 
differently. The PIP guidance for external feedback can come across like that. [EMG group member] 
MultiNat’s mandate for PIP implementation was a second environmental factor that could have been 
an unfreezing force. DevCo’s management did not seek to establish a shared understanding with its 
employees about how the company would achieve the mandate. Rather, they presented it as an act of 
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compliance commitment (Armenakis et al., 1999): DevCo’s management was complying with MultiNat 
and thus expected its employees to comply with their directive. Consider the following statements from 
DevCo’s president (both made during all-hands meetings): 
Kevin, stand up. Kevin is the Lone Ranger. He is responsible to make sure we achieve the Silver 
Certification. 
If we do not achieve the Silver certification by the June milestone, there will be no Christmas. Please 
consider delaying your vacation plans until the audit is complete. 
We committed to MultiNat that we would achieve these levels. It is important that we keep those 
commitments. 
A third potential unfreezing force came from the activities prescribed by the PIP. A general tenet of 
PIPs is that organizations attain a more accurate view of their current state operations by adopting structured 
techniques for data collection and problem solving (Table 1). The visualization of waste and inefficiencies 
should then create a pull for improvement (Zmud, 1984) that is addressed by the PIP tools being pushed 
into practice. DevCo’s PIP required groups to survey internal stakeholders who were part of their value 
stream, upstream and downstream, to understand the perceived quality of their services and identify areas 
of waste. For DevCo’s Engineering department, this involved collecting survey data from the other 
departments in Table 3. 
The survey used the input-process-output (I-P-O) model (Ilgen et al., 2005) under the premise that the 
Engineering group received inputs, executed a process (or set of processes), and produced outputs, about 
which their downstream customers could assess value via a satisfaction survey. However, the survey results 
did not clearly identify waste and inefficiencies in DevCo’s engineering processes in ways that motivated 
the engineers to change. For example: 
Why are we measuring internal defects when the majority of difficulties we experience in executing 
our work are caused by other groups? [Engineering manager A] 
The PIP requires us to document lessons learned, but most of our lessons learned are things the 
group giving us information needs to do differently. [Project engineer] 
The reason our survey feedback is this way is that they don’t understand the complexity of our 
process. [Engineering manager B] 
[Group A] got the Silver certification last week, because they evaluated themselves. People who 
interact with them would not agree that their output is anywhere near that good. [Engineering 
manager C] 
DevCo’s engineers did not agree with the interpretations of their upstream and downstream customers. 
They discounted the feedback from other departments, pretended some problems identified in the survey 
results did not exist, and were skeptical about the relevance of a change message driven by external 
feedback: 
One characteristic of emerging markets is the need to assume that most customers for your product 
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don’t exist. The ones who do must be reeducated so they can fully appreciate what you’re offering 
them. The last thing you want to do is assume they are right about whether what you offer them 
provides value. [DevCo engineer] 
4.2.2 Months 6 – 18, Changing: Adopting the PIP 
MultiNat’s PIP architects wanted the PIP’s principles ingrained in all aspects of daily activity 
throughout its divisions. They used the operating system (OS) metaphor to symbolize a desire that problem-
solving tools and methods for reducing variation be embedded in written processes, procedures, and 
standard work—not just in the heads of individual engineers. They presumed that such embeddedness 
would then require only limited, explicit reinforcement of the PIP. Both of these characteristics made the 
OS an appealing symbol for MultiNat’s PIP architects. The term was used routinely in communications 
about the PIP, as well as in discussions among the PIP steering committee (who regularly referred to the 
PIP as “the operating system” during their meetings). 
We found that DevCo’s engineers did not share this view.  For them, the OS symbolized an intent to 
transform work they believed required high levels of conceptual and cognitive skill (what Blackler (1995) 
called embrained knowledge) into work that was embedded into automated routines. They often stated that 
PD activities required significant human skill. During a meeting in preparation for the Silver audit, one 
engineer stated emphatically, “You can train a monkey to follow a process. You cannot train a monkey to 
do the work we do.” As a result of this skepticism, DevCo’s engineers did not believe that the PIP’s tools 
could facilitate structured problem solving in their environment. They also did not view repeatability in 
their daily activities as a desirable characteristic. Consider the following discussion: 
The PIP is a waste of time. [Engineer 1] 
You say that, but you’re the first person I see writing a macro with your spreadsheets to make sure 
that your analysis is repeatable. You do this because it makes your work more consistent and makes 
your life easier. Those are the types of opportunities the PIP is looking for. [EMG member] 
People need to think critically about the work they do. As soon as you codify a tool like this, they 
will use it without thinking about the inputs or the outputs in their analysis. Let [Engineer 1] write 
his own macro, but don’t try and standardize it so that the rest of the department is forced to use it. 
[Engineer 2] 
Despite skepticism about the prescribed tools and behaviors, we also found that DevCo’s engineers 
were interested in working more efficiently. Indeed, DevCo’s engineers frequently discussed the waste 
embedded in their daily activities. This frustration signified both dissatisfaction with DevCo’s status quo 
and willingness to use PIP principles to improve their work: 
None of us disagree with the philosophy you’re proposing [regarding the problems that the PIP 
should address]. Many of us don’t see how the extensive and overlapping audit requirements support 
that philosophy. [Engineering manager] 
I could get excited about the PIP’s statistical process control activity and data management tool if 
you show me that it is a reliable, fast way to collect field problems. [Project engineer] 
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This combination of dissatisfaction with the status quo and willingness to use PIP principles and tools 
showed us that the concerns of DevCo’s engineers—how to manage information flow and scarce resources 
to conduct PD efforts in ways that select design solutions efficiently and effectively—overlapped with the 
concerns of the PIP’s architects. These overlapping concerns suggested that the PIP could apply continuous 
improvement principles to PD work in the same way that traditional improvements applied those principles 
to production tasks. This potential is reflected in the following discussion: 
People assume that the goal of the PIP is to lock down processes. That leads to concerns that it stifles 
innovation. What if you defined critical processes as ones that need to change? For example, an 
auditor could say “I will be back in six months. I expect to find changes to each of the key processes 
we discussed today based on the weaknesses you have identified.” [EMG member] 
You are right that the PIP criteria do not prohibit this approach. It would take some work to explain 
it and manage the expectations of the auditor. [Kevin] 
Our data suggested that the PIP could help DevCo’s engineers identify opportunities to improve their 
PD activities (the knowledge-work equivalent to control charts being out of bounds) instead of seeking to 
transform knowledge work into production tasks. The following statements provide more concrete 
examples. 
It is frustrating that people discard the idea of process improvement when they say it doesn’t apply 
to our labs. I would love to standardize how we collect information that defines a test, and also how 
we store it afterwards. I don’t want to restrict the actual tests – that is the real creative work to 
explore new technology. I just don’t feel like there’s anything creative about all the time we waste 
setting up tests and looking for data afterwards. [Engineering manager]  
Yesterday’s presentation from MultiNat reinforced that the PIP is not relevant here. I understand its 
value for manufacturing. We don’t have anything stable enough that we want to lock it down and 
not try something different. I do believe [DevCo] must find a cheaper, faster way to develop new 
technology ideas. If we went to a company with the platform we sold in 2004, no one would want 
it because it is obsolete. Maybe there are tools in the PIP that we could use to facilitate that change. 
[Engineering manager] 
Particularly in the transition to the Gold Planning phase, our informants began to describe a different 
way that DevCo could operate (responding in part to the market pressures described in Section 3.1). Their 
descriptions provided insights about how the PIP could facilitate that different operation. These insights 
encompassed control of both tools (e.g., the checklists, forms, and procedures that are typical targets for 
PIP efforts) and behaviors, or patterns of action (Pentland and Feldman, 2008), that could improve the 
learning behaviors (Choo et al., 2007) of the teams doing PD work. The discussion below illustrates these 
findings. 
In Systems Engineering we use the principle of a performance-based specification quite a bit. Could 
we use that idea with the PIP? For example, DevCo’s top management could define the high-level 
functional requirements for the PIP based on explicitly linking it to current business needs. The 
Engineering managers could identify the solutions to the requirements and decompose these 
requirements into specifications for activity within their respective groups. They could then re-
integrate the individual activities into a complete output that meets the original performance 
requirement. [EMG member] 
21 
 
That approach is not expressly prohibited by MultiNat’s PIP architects. It’s certainly uncommon. 
Using your SE example, the more common practice is to specify solutions rather than functional 
requirements. [Kevin] 
4.2.3 Months 18 – 24, Re-freezing with the PIP 
According to Armenakis and Harris (2002), the adoption stage is an experimental period during which 
employees may still choose to reject a proposed change. Institutionalizing the change into a new set of 
norms (re-freezing) requires providing resources to reinforce the changes made and demonstrating direct 
benefit (answering the “What’s in it for me?” question). Section 4.2.2 showed that, despite the incomplete 
unfreezing discussed in Section 4.2.1, DevCo’s employees acknowledged that “there might be something 
in it for me.” Thus, the experimental period of change adoption, which ended with symbolic success of 
achieving the Silver certification milestone, included interest in substantive implementation during the Gold 
phase. However, we found several potential barriers to this interest. 
Besides strongly embedding the PIP across MultiNat’s divisions, the PIP’s architects intended for it to 
be imposed organically rather than externally. During one steering committee meeting, the idea of process 
control requiring specialists who were competent in specific software tools (such as Minitab) was actively 
discussed and ultimately rejected, because requiring specialists detracted from the PIP being a grassroots 
improvement program. At DevCo, we found that this vision of organic change was problematic because of 
ambiguity regarding which resources were required to institutionalize the PIP and where those resources 
should be applied. One of the MultiNat managers we interviewed questioned whether grassroots change 
was an adequate mechanism to embed the PIP principles. 
DevCo’s Vice President of Engineering stated that the company’s investment of more than one million 
dollars in the PIP during the Bronze and Silver phases signified its commitment to implementation. 
However, these funds were used primarily for one-hour awareness classes, providing just an overview of 
the PIP tools, with limited discussion of how to apply them. 
DevCo’s communications about the PIP did not make a strong case for its relevance to daily activities 
in ways that demonstrated its short-term value. In 2005-2006, during each quarterly, 60-90 minute, all-
hands meeting, the PIP received a single slide. Each meeting emphasized that DevCo already considered 
itself the dominant player in its market—a dissonant message from the one that best-in-class performance 
would only be achieved by PIP progression to Gold. By not using these meetings as a communication 
channel to address questions about appropriateness, ambiguity of resources, and direct benefits, DevCo 
missed opportunities to address the barriers to institutionalizing the PIP. By not communicating small wins, 
such as informing the organization when individual groups passed their Silver assessments, DevCo tacitly 
conveyed that, while non-compliance to PIP milestones would be punished, compliance would not be 
celebrated. The result was a diminished sense of personal benefit and a lack of motivation to support the 
PIP implementation from DevCo’s engineers. For examples: 
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The PIP came from a high-volume manufacturing environment, which we don’t have. It is used at 
divisions that are established players in mature markets, which we are not. It is marginally relevant 
at best. It is probably flat-out wrong because the other divisions do not understand how we operate 
here. [Engineering manager] 
The most difficult thing I’ve found about getting others to accept the time demands of the Silver 
certification is that I can’t clearly answer the questions, “Why should I do this? How will I concretely 
benefit from it?” Appealing to happy customers does not work if you consider customers ignorant 
and unable to evaluate important product features. Appealing to the goal of becoming the best in the 
world does not work if you believe you already are. Appealing to future improvements does not 
answer the question, “If my resources are already scarce, why should I invest in an activity that 
benefits someone else, but not me?” [EMG Member] 
Why are we doing this when management has not given us the resources to fix problems in the past? 
They will use this data to create charts that allow them to yell at us about how we should be doing 
things differently with no support. [Project engineer] 
MultiNat’s PIP architects intended for higher levels of PIP progression (from Bronze to Gold) to cor-
respond with improved quality and increased market share. The waste in day-to-day activities was supposed 
to steadily decrease, culminating in being “world class” upon reaching the Gold level. DevCo’s president 
reinforced this view with his statements that the firm would benefit from the PIP in the future—e.g.: 
When we get to mass production and our products are rolling off the assembly line, we will need 
the PIP to help us operate. 
Hackman and Wageman (1995) found that during times of organizational change, challenging targets 
that focus on reducing mistakes will not increase employee motivation to identify and implement 
improvements. In DevCo’s case, many of our informants believed that the Silver certification was achieved 
without any substantive change. Thus, achieving the Silver certification milestone actually created 
disillusion about adopting the PIP: 
I didn’t realize how broken our process was until we started working on this certification activity. I 
feel hypocritical pulling data together for the Silver assessments, even though it’s been made very 
clear that not passing in June is unacceptable. [PIP implementation lead] 
At a celebration lunch for the Engineering department upon reaching Silver, the Engineering VP’s 
speech framed the accomplishment merely as a precursor to the hard work ahead to reach Gold. A manager 
at the first author’s table said with a weary sigh, “process improvement.” 
5 Discussion:  Implications for the Effectiveness of PIP Implementation 
Figure 1 summarizes our findings against the framework for managing a change initiative in Section 
2.3. The themes from Section 4 show that DevCo’s implementation of the PIP is more than simply a case 
of things “going wrong.” Our informants expressed both dissatisfaction with the Silver Implementation 
phase and interest in performing their PD work more effectively. DevCo’s management was specifically 
looking for lessons learned and improvements as it entered the Gold Planning phase. These themes reflect 
the barriers and opportunities encountered when implementing a PIP in a complex, sociotechnical system. 
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These conditions are common in large organizations where many OM practitioners and researchers do their 
work. In the rest of this section, we discuss these findings in more detail, distill eight propositions, and 
identify opportunities for future research. 
 
  
Figure 1: Factors proposed to affect the effectiveness of PIP implementation in PD contexts 
 
5.1 Unfreezing: Implications Regarding Readiness to Change 
5.1.1 Conflicting Environmental Interpretations  
Discussions of change implementation often emphasize the importance of conveying urgency from the 
change agent’s perspective and understanding how this urgency is perceived by the change recipients (Jiao 
and Zhao, 2014). However, Hackman and Wageman (1995) found that organizations frequently reinforce 
existing routines when initially confronted with evidence of their underperformance. Repenning (2000) and 
Schein (1996) found that unfreezing forces like fear only motivate organizational change when a credible 
signal exists for the perceived threat. Weeks (2004) found that shared readiness to change could still mask 
disagreements about the motivating factors—the why to change. At DevCo we found both a lack of shared 
readiness to change and disagreements about the factors motivating change. Of the three potential 
unfreezing forces that might motivate DevCo to implement the PIP (the market downturn, the mandate 
from MultiNat, and process data collected during the initial implementation), DevCo’s management 
prioritized achieving the Silver certification by their declared deadline. The term “Lone Ranger,” while 
used in jest, implied that DevCo’s engineers were unwilling participants in the PIP activities. The request 
to sacrifice vacation implied negative consequences for missing the deadline rather than a shared 
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commitment to meet a goal. The mandatory implementation of the PIP as a management priority, without 
corresponding effort to articulate it as an employee priority, leads to our first proposition: 
Proposition 1: A mandatory PIP implementation will be less effective when conflicting interpretations of 
environmental signals diminish shared urgency to change. 
While fairly general as stated, this proposition portends several more-specific research questions for 
future work. What role does context play in contributing to conflicting interpretations? Are environmental 
signals interpreted consistently in some contexts and inconsistently in others, such as PD? If so, which 
characteristics of different contexts contribute to this inconsistency? What actions are needed to build 
shared urgency to change in the presence of multiple interpretations? Is it possible to operationalize the 
construct of shared urgency (e.g., via consensus analysis or mental models) and thereby identify both 
barriers and opportunities for creating readiness to change? Is there a threshold of shared urgency that 
provides “good enough” unfreezing for an organization to proceed with its change? 
5.1.2 Inadequate PIP Tools did not Accurately Measure Operational Complexity 
Melnyk et al.’s (2010) study of an organization seeking to change from standardized production to 
radical innovation found that hidden causal paths from metrics to behaviors can create differences between 
the desired outcome (radical innovation) and the realized outcome (maintaining the status quo). Our data 
from DevCo extend these findings by showing that the absence of feedback paths from behavioral outcomes 
to the driving metrics limits an organization’s ability to unfreeze. DevCo’s PIP assumed that PD work could 
be measured as a single, linear path from inputs to outcomes (between stages 5 [Process Capability] and 7 
[Know-why] in Bohn’s (1994) typology of knowledge stages). Our data showed that DevCo’s engineers 
did not experience their work as a linear process with immediate, direct impacts. That is consistent with 
findings from PIP deployment in other knowledge work contexts (Staats et al., 2011). In contrast with 
directly observable, standardized production contexts, the impact of non-programmed and innovative work 
is distributed through time and space across the organization. Coordination and control are problematic, 
because multiple parties receive information and make decisions, and system boundaries vary depending 
on the topic under consideration (Weick, 2001). Activities such as modeling processes, determining causes 
and effects, identifying sources of variation, and determining process failure modes all become more 
challenging in this context (Browning, 2003; Browning et al., 2006). 
Due to this operational complexity, DevCo’s engineers did not understand how the impacts of their 
work was felt by other departments. They interpreted findings from their own data collection in ways that 
protected themselves rather than capitalized on potential opportunities to change. The result was inhibited 
learning (Argyris, 1994) due to the disagreement about the Engineering organization’s current 
(unmeasured) state and need to change, and thus a lack of consensus about whether the collected data could 
or should be used to identify a desirable future state. Hence, we propose that: 
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Proposition 2: If the tools used to gather data do not identify clear and adequate gaps between the current 
and the desired states, then the mandatory PIP implementation will be less effective. 
P2 suggests that some typical PIP tools may need further development when transferred to PD contexts, 
or that different tools (that model the network of PD tasks as a complex system) may be more appropriate. 
Further research could explore several lines of questioning. For example, are tools that model and measure 
a PD process as a linear path adequate, if the process and environment are mapped at the right level of 
detail? Or, are process modeling tools that convey linear paths inherently unsuitable for PD environments 
(where knowledge might only be between stages 2 [Awareness] and 4 [Control of the mean] in Bohn’s 
typology), and therefore different tools and/or visual displays are needed? Are particular types of data more 
or less vulnerable to the inadequacies seen at DevCo (e.g., can some PIP tools be directly transferred while 
others may need to be contextualized)? 
5.2 Implications Regarding Adoption of the Change 
5.2.1 A Barrier: Problematic PIP Metaphors 
Armenakis (1999:100) identified three reasons for organizational members to adopt a change and 
exhibit its associated behaviors: (1) to gain reward or avoid punishment; (2) to form a desired relationship 
with an individual, work group, supervisor, or the organization; (3) to internalize a behavior they believe is 
intrinsically appealing and proper. Symbols and metaphors affect this adoption because they can merge 
rational and irrational aspects of a change experience (either the message or the response) (Fox and 
Amichai-Hamburger (2001). Specifically, a well-designed metaphor can be an efficient mechanism to 
transfer both a set of practices and their associated meanings from one context to another. Metaphors thus 
impact the ability of an organization to transfer PIP practices from one location to another without 
consuming substantial amounts of time and resources (what Szulanski (1996, 2000) and Danese et al. (2017)  
called the stickiness of best practices). 
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, the OS metaphor conveyed a set of PIP practices and meanings that 
MultiNat’s PIP architects found beneficial (because it identified behaviors associated with consistency by 
making tacit knowledge explicit).  In contrast, DevCo’s engineers did not find the practices and meanings 
of the OS metaphor beneficial (even though they acknowledged that some elements of behavior advocated 
by the PIP were useful, such as ensuring repeatable outputs from individual tasks). DevCo’s engineers 
interpreted the OS metaphor in their own way. They did not believe that codifying best practices was 
desirable (our data shows they believed the opposite). The OS metaphor did not have its desired positive 
effect, because MultiNat’s PIP architects did not appreciate the unintended consequences of these divergent 
interpretations, nor did they allocate the amount of resources required to ensure that their intended 
interpretation transferred to DevCo. This leads us to propose: 
Proposition 3: PIP metaphors that are problematic (because their meaning is not shared or because 
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conveying their intended meaning consumes unplanned resources) will diminish the 
appropriateness of the change message, thereby making PIP implementation less effective. 
Although P3 is likely to generalize beyond a PD context, our evidence from DevCo indicated that the 
context mattered in the sense that engineers seemed particularly likely to identify alternative interpretations 
for the OS symbol. That is, the context is likely to matter greatly in the determination of whether or not 
workers share a symbol’s interpretation. Further research could explore the role of symbols specifically 
related to PIP deployment. For example, could a metaphor like the OS be used more effectively in non-
engineering contexts? What characteristics contribute to symbols having shared levels of motivational 
power across the front and back stages? If individuals agree that some form of change is needed but disagree 
with the specific change being proposed (Armenakis and Harris, 2002:170), can metaphors be used to 
negotiate consensus about what constitutes an appropriate change? 
5.2.2 An Opportunity: Using the PIP to Develop Flexible Routines   
By defining the PIP as its OS, MultiNat’s PIP architects sought strong embeddedness (Howard-
Grenville, 2005) of the PIP’s principles. This meant the PIP should contain significant and consequential 
overlap with existing structures and expectations, that there would be reinforcing artifacts, and that its use 
would become increasingly pervasive. In other words, the organizational behaviors would be guided by 
prescribed tools that enabled DevCo to meet the PIP’s certification criteria. Therefore, the PIP sought to 
establish a strong causal path from its certification outcomes through its prescribed tools to the expected 
behaviors. 
We found that the PIP implementation did not achieve strong embeddedness at DevCo. Nevertheless, 
our data showed that DevCo’s engineers were interested in changing how they performed their work, and 
that they acknowledged the potential of PIP principles to help them change. In their studies of ambivalence, 
Meyerson (2003; 2001) and Meyerson and Scully (1995) found that many individuals saw flaws in both the 
status quo and the mandated change initiative. They suggested that feedback from these individuals could 
identify previously overlooked causal paths that would enable the organization to change more effectively. 
Using such feedback to modify tools and patterns of action, as our data suggested DevCo had the potential 
to do, corresponds with weakly embedded routines (Howard-Grenville, 2005). Rather than being deployed 
solely via the prescribed causal paths associated with strong embeddedness, weakly embedded routines 
exist in the presence of competing artifacts and expectations, can be relatively easily adapted to new uses, 
and simultaneously employ multiple variants. The construct of weak embeddedness supports findings by 
Staats et al. (2011) regarding the limited value of high task specificity when implementing Lean in 
knowledge work contexts. It suggests that a PIP architecture should evolve through its implementation in 
similar ways to how a product architecture evolves through the PD lifecycle. We summarize the benefits of 
weak embeddedness as: 
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Proposition 4: Planned flexibility to adopt PIP principles (weakly embedded routines) will improve 
employee views of their appropriateness, thereby increasing effectiveness of the PIP 
implementation. 
Further research should unpack how weak embeddedness facilitates the transfer of PIP principles to 
new contexts. For example, some researchers have found change to be effective when middle managers 
bargain, negotiate, and reframe scope (Heyden et al., 2017; Huy, 2001). In contrast, Melnyk et al. (2010) 
found that too much flexibility for middle managers enabled preservation of the status quo, even when they 
agreed with the principles of the change. Thus, weak embeddedness needs to allow enough variation to 
flexibility to adapt routines, while at the same time not preserving the status quo (Austin, 1996). Interesting 
research questions to explore in this area include:  What is the most effective way to connect PIP goals 
(means) with business needs and results (ends)? Can PIP goals be parsed across an organization in ways 
that consider contexts such as PD and their varied stages of knowledge (Bohn 1994)? What level of task 
specificity enables improvement without reducing individuals’ abilities to perform their knowledge work 
effectively? Should managers seek a different level of embeddedness with PIP principles than with PIP 
tools? What oversight is needed to enable the bargaining and negotiation associated with weak 
embeddedness, while still ensuring the adoption of PIP principles and elevation from the status quo? Again, 
many of these questions can apply beyond a PD context, although the particulars of this context are likely 
to influence the answers strongly. 
5.2.3 Another Opportunity: Tailoring PIP Principles 
Initiatives seeking transformational change (i.e., strongly embedded, pervasively applied routines) view 
weak embeddedness as generating “organizational noise.” Nevertheless, the construct provides 
opportunities for experiments with new ideas that can evolve into significant catalysts for change. Many of 
these experiments are conducted by individuals who identify flaws in their organizations’ arguments and 
rhetoric for  both change and maintaining the status quo (Meyerson, 2003; Meyerson, 2001; Meyerson and 
Scully, 1995). When transferring PIP principles to PD contexts, these experiments can provide important 
insights about implementation progress. For example, the guidance material for DevCo’s PIP audits 
emphasized principles influenced by areas of repeatable, high-volume production and transactional 
environments. This is consistent with the heritage of the PIP’s Lean tools and practices, as well as its 
original context at MultiNat. Meanwhile, MultiNat’s PIP architects acknowledged the desire to manage 
information flow and encourage creativity, albeit generally in terms of future improvements to the PIP 
documentation and guidance. Moreover, our data suggested that DevCo’s engineers believed that removing 
waste could help them demonstrate the skilled innovation that they felt the recently cancelled contracts had 
called into question. Similar to findings by Victor et al. (2000) and Staats et al. (2011), we expect that 
tailoring PIP principles to effectively integrate these kinds of overlapping interests would be associated 
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with more reliable team performance, improved problem identification and resolution, less avoidance of 
PIP activities, shorter lead times to implement improvement ideas, and more widespread adoption of PIP 
activities (as opposed to participation being limited to specialists and/or managers). 
Proposition 5: Tailoring PIP principles to new contexts (such as PD) will improve adoption and increase 
effectiveness of the PIP implementation. 
Similar to the approach suggested by Browning and Sanders (2012), P5 reconceptualizes the construct 
of PIP scope away from off-the-shelf practices (“It worked there, so do it here”) toward contextualization 
of underlying principles. This is relevant for both broadly determining the appropriate amount of flexibility 
in PIP implementation (e.g., balancing strong and weak embeddedness) and more specifically determining 
how to manage flexibility when transferring particular practices. In the first instance, there is much to be 
leveraged from OM learning about adapting project management tools to different PD projects and 
organizational contexts (e.g., Chandrasekaran et al., 2015; Pich et al., 2002). Sting et al. (2015) 
demonstrated the second instance when adapting rapid escalation of problems from the hierarchical 
responsibility of Andon systems in Lean manufacturing contexts to team-oriented problem solving in PD. 
Future research could explore the application of continuous improvement (CI) principles to PD work 
that involves “situated knowing” (Blackler, 1995). Specific areas could include, e.g.: the tradeoffs between 
formalization and abstraction that are needed to achieve both flexibility and embeddedness, the 
characteristics of “task switching” between CI and knowledge work tasks, the environmental cues that 
enable switching (specifically when dealing with attributes of operational complexity such as low task 
specificity, work outputs separated in time and space, and architectural ambiguity), and the definition of 
PD job roles that enable such switching. Further research is also needed regarding the factors associated 
with the method for and optimal amount of PIP tailoring, customization, and contextualization. 
5.3 Re-freezing: Implications Regarding Institutionalization of the Change  
5.3.1 Limits of Symbolic Compliance: Distant Benefits and Empty Milestone Compliance 
According to Reger et al. (1994), employees will not accept a change message if they believe it is 
unrealistic (high stress about the change) or unnecessary (high inertia to maintain the status quo). Section 
4.2.1 discusses these dynamics at DevCo during the Silver PIP implementation. However, as discussed in 
Section 4.2.2, DevCo’s engineers were willing to adopt the PIP principles, albeit not always in the forms 
presented during the Silver implementation. This suggests that the potential for commitment to the PIP’s 
underlying principles was not articulated during the Silver implementation. Although not required for 
Silver, the criteria to reach Gold included requirements to demonstrate measurable commitment. (The PIP 
architects frequently discussed the exact measure to use; they recognized it was not straightforward.) Thus, 
DevCo’s emphasis on implementing the PIP as an act of symbolic compliance to meet external milestones, 
focusing only on long-term benefits, (1) created disillusion due to the perceived lack of substantive change, 
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(2) neglected feedback about how to institutionalize the PIP effectively in DevCo’s context, and (3) missed 
an opportunity to nurture the commitment that was required for the Gold phase of implementation. These 
findings lead to our next propositions: 
 Proposition 6 : Emphasizing long-term benefits (without short-term “quick wins”) creates perceptions of 
gaps between symbolic and substantive success and reduces personal benefit, thereby 
hindering the institutionalization of PIP principles and reducing PIP effectiveness. 
Proposition 7: Mandatory PIP implementation that emphasizes achieving externally imposed deadlines 
and milestones will limit employees’ commitment to its principles, thereby hindering the 
institutionalization of PIP principles and reducing PIP effectiveness. 
P6 and P7 show how messages about the PIP implementation from the PIP architects contributed to 
both stress and indifference for employees, thus further hindering the transition from adoption to 
institutionalization. Future work in this area could explore at least two themes. First, what factors contribute 
to receiving a PIP’s change message with stress and/or indifference? Are these factors related to PIP 
particular contexts? Like our discussion about the OS metaphor with P3, are there specific characteristics 
of PD environments (e.g., operational complexity, non-obvious/indirect causal paths, or longer time lags 
between causes and effects) that make them particularly problematic? Second, is it possible for change 
agents to manage messages about PIP implementation in PD contexts more effectively? What combination 
of messages is required to maintain focus on a long-term goal without disregarding near (in time and space) 
changes that represent progress towards the desired future state? Is there a combination of messages that 
can help employees internalize the new behaviors instead of displaying them simply to gain reward or avoid 
punishment? Assuming that perceived gaps between symbolic and substantive change can be reduced but 
never eliminated, when does a gap become “small enough” to facilitate institutionalization of the adopted 
change? Are there more or less effective ways to apply limited resources toward reducing the gap when 
PIPs are being coercively implemented under external pressures (such as MultiNat’s mandate)? 
5.3.2 Limits of Grassroots Adoption  
DevCo could have organically implemented the PIP under two conditions. First, the PIP needed to be 
strongly embedded so that there was a clear causal path from the stated metric (Silver Certification with 
adoption of the PIP’s tools) to the associated behavior of using the tools. Second, the awareness of future 
benefits from the PIP had to convince DevCo’s employees to adopt new behavior (Bernard (2002) called 
this the educational model of social change). These conditions would allow deployment of the PIP under 
the premise that requiring extra effort in the short term (e.g., during the Silver Implementation), would yield 
tangible benefits that reinforced it. (Repenning and Sterman (2001) called this working smarter.) Indeed, 
DevCo frequently used the anticipated cost savings from more efficient operations to justify the lack of 
further budget for PIP implementation. 
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We found that DevCo did not meet these two conditions. DevCo’s emphasis on long-term benefits did 
not identify the specific, short-term benefits (“quick wins”) expected from the Silver implementation. 
DevCo’s engineers interpreted the data collected using the PIP’s tools as a justification to maintain the 
status quo (P2). The OS metaphor did not generate enthusiasm about adopting the PIP’s tools and behaviors 
(P3). These results confirm other research findings that re-freezing to a new status quo will not occur 
without adequate resources (Armenakis et al., 1999). This discredits the assumptions behind resource 
allocation decisions for DevCo’s PIP implementation and probes the conditions under which working 
smarter (for free) yields sufficient benefits to gain traction for institutionalizing a change. DevCo invested 
enough in awareness of the PIP deadlines to achieve symbolic success with the Silver Implementation. 
Those resources were insufficient for DevCo’s engineers to internalize the PIP principles and 
institutionalize them with substantive new behavior. These findings confirm Bernard’s (2002) assertion that 
the educational model of social change can be effective when the targeted behavior exists at superstructural 
levels of society (e.g., changing brand preferences) but tends to be less effective when the targeted behavior 
is rooted in the structure or infrastructure of a group. The desire that the PIP be a grassroots initiative, 
coupled with the assumptions of strong embeddedness, actually hindered DevCo’s ability to discuss the 
need for additional resources for PIP implementation. This leads to our final proposition. 
Proposition 8: Relying on grassroots adoption of a mandatory PIP leads to inadequate resources for PIP 
institutionalization, thereby limiting PIP effectiveness.  
This general proposition prompts further, more specific research. At DevCo we discovered several 
structural indicators that the resources applied to generate awareness of the PIP during the Silver 
Implementation did not harness the interest of engineers in actually adopting the PIP principles: the 
inadequacy of the PIP tools (poorly suited for DevCo’s PD context), the need for weak embeddedness (a 
factor of DevCo’s PD context), and the problematic OS metaphor (a factor of the mental models held by 
DevCo’s engineers). Are there other circumstances under which the conditions of strong embeddedness 
and the educational model of social change do not apply for PIP implementation? Under these 
circumstances, what strategy should managers use to allocate resources for awareness, training, and 
assessment to institutionalize a work smarter approach? Given that the ideal level of resources is rarely 
available, how do decision makers satisfice to match the available resources with the most important factors 
for PIP deployment? 
6 Conclusion 
6.1 Implications for Research and Practice 
Both the academic and practitioner literature have refined the characteristics of successful PIP 
implementation in manufacturing contexts. Both sets of literature agree that a successful PIP 
implementation will institutionalize new practices. However, neither body of literature rigorously 
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articulates the challenges of transferring PIP principles to a PD context. Due to this gap in understanding, 
PIP implementations in PD have encountered problems that prevent them from achieving their intended 
benefits. Our study addresses this practical challenge by deeply exploring DevCo’s PIP implementation in 
light of organizational change theory. We ground our empirical observations with predictions from existing 
theory (Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007) by drawing from OM-centric literature about PIP scope and 
context (Sections 2.1 and 2.2) and from extra-OM literature about change implementation (Section 2.3). 
The findings in this paper elaborate two main areas of theory about PIP implementation and 
organizational change: (1) guiding the transfer of PIP principles (e.g., Lean and/or Six Sigma) from a 
repetitive production context to that of PD and (2) guiding the process of PIP implementation by clarifying 
sources of (and hopefully ways to reduce) the gap between symbolic and substantive success. The resulting 
propositions, summarized in Table 7, provide several insights on the research question of how to implement 
PIPs reliably when reconceptualizing the principles in new contexts.  
Our examination of change agent (MultiNat’s PIP council and DevCo’s management) and employee 
(DevCo’s engineers) data sheds specific light on the underlying organizational context and “previously 
unexplored relationships” (Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007) that present opportunities and hazards for 
effective PIP implementation. These findings identify some of the characteristics that contributed to a lack 
of substantive change during DevCo’s PIP Silver implementation. We “re-conceptualize the existing 
construct” (Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007) of PIP scope by showing how the goal of continuous 
improvement can be tailored to improve knowledge work in PD contexts. Specifically, DevCo’s engineers 
identified a narrow “change acceptance zone” (Reger et al., 1994) for adopting the PIP principles—a 
tailored, weakly embedded program that continuously improves their work without seeking standardized 
production of its tasks. These findings show how a PIP can amplify creativity in high-uncertainty conditions 
by enhancing the flow of value-adding information within and among PD teams. Re-casting a PIP with this 
view enables an organization to sustain change and progress while it adapts its PD activities to evolving 
product and market conditions.   
Table 7: Findings and Implications from DevCo’s PIP Implementation 
Lewin Element Case Study Findings from DevCo (Section 4) Managerial Implications for Transferring PIPs 
to New Contexts  
Unfreeze: 
Remove the 
restraining 
forces that 
maintain the 
status quo 
• Management priorities to comply with MultiNat’s 
PIP implementation directive were not shared by 
the employees. 
• Employees had conflicting interpretations of 
DevCo’s market pressures. 
• PIP data did not generate the expected learning 
due to process complexities that were not 
recognized by the I-P-O-based tools. 
Change agents should ensure that there are 
shared interpretations of urgency to change (P1). 
 
PIP architects should understand the risk that 
tools are not used in ways which produce data 
that creates a credible discrepancy between the 
current and desired future state (P2). 
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Change: 
Restructure 
thoughts, 
perceptions, 
feelings, and 
attitudes toward 
acceptance of 
the proposed 
solution 
• Communications emphasized meeting schedule 
deadlines and did not communicate efficacy. 
• Employee interpretation of the OS metaphor 
resulted in skepticism of the PIPs aims. 
• Employees recognized (a) presence of daily waste 
and (b) that removal of that waste (via adopting 
PIP principles) could enable more effective 
innovation and PD efforts. 
Metaphors must align interpretations of how 
appropriate a PIP is for the context (P3) 
 
PIP architects should allow for weakly 
embedded PIP routines in PD contexts (P4)  
 
PIP architects should tailor PIP principles to PD 
contexts (P5) 
Freeze: 
Reinforce the 
proposed 
solution and 
ensure it is 
congruent with 
the target 
organization 
• Leadership desires for organic change created 
ambiguity about necessary resources. 
• Leadership emphasis on compliance and long-
term benefits did not identify short-term benefits. 
• Employees expressed disillusion when PIP 
implementation did not yield expected substantive 
changes.  
 
If the PIP does not demonstrate near (in time and 
space) benefits from adoption, the resulting 
disillusion will hinder institutionalization (P6-7). 
 
Mandated PIP implementation requires that 
companies dedicate resources to articulating 
application in the new context, because 
principles which are self-evident or desirable to 
PIP architects may not be clear at the working 
level (P8). 
 
6.2 Limitations and Final Thoughts 
Like Aime et al. (2014), our study reveals and proposes phenomena of interest rather than testing formal 
hypotheses. This imposes limitations. First, our longitudinal study draws from a single, clinical study of 
DevCo’s experience. Like Bhakoo and Choi (2013), we address this by (1) not making overarching 
generalizations, (2) seeking breadth in our data collection at DevCo (to support internal validity), and (3) 
grounding our findings with pertinent literature (to elaborate theory in externally valid ways). Second, our 
study focuses on the process of PIP implementation rather than the characteristics of mature PIPs. We 
concluded our two-year study at DevCo after the Gold Planning phase due to a variety of factors that 
prevented further data collection (the first author changed roles, DevCo was restructured with some of its 
product lines moving to other MultiNat divisions, and MultiNat eventually sold DevCo to another 
company). After many problematic turns, it is possible that companies like DevCo could eventually exhibit 
the characteristics associated with mature PIP implementation. However, despite not knowing whether 
DevCo’s PIP implementation ultimately achieved substantive success, we believe the findings from the 
Silver implementation are relevant for the broader OM community, which experiences similar mandates 
for compliance with prescribed best practices.  Third, our study shows that context matters in the transfer 
of PIP principles, and that aspects of implementation such as metaphors and tools interact with the stickiness 
of knowledge in these principles.  This opens the door for future research on how context and stickiness 
manifest in the transfer of PIP principles and (more importantly) what OM practitioners should do 
differently with this knowledge.  
Our results help both researchers and practitioners explore the question of how to sustainably transfer 
PIP principles to PD contexts. Based solely on our findings in Section 4, we cannot conclude that DevCo’s 
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attempt to transfer the PIP from the manufacturing context of MultiNat’s other divisions to its own PD 
context was unsuccessful. Instead, like the findings of Canato and colleagues (Canato and Ravasi, 2014; 
Canato et al., 2013) regarding the adoption of Six Sigma at 3M, our findings show opportunities to adapt 
PIP implementation to a PD context, as well as potential challenges with implementing a PIP in a manner 
that yields substantive organizational change in much broader contexts. Observing how DevCo responded 
to the PIP implementation provided “deeper understanding of how success might ultimately be achieved” 
(Melnyk et al., 2010:570). The resulting propositions enable OM researchers and practitioners to “direct 
their efforts at understanding why and how these [factors associated with effective PIP implementation] 
came to be” (Hambrick, 2007). 
These findings may not seem completely surprising to someone well-versed in the challenges of 
organizational change theory. However, this does not describe most OM researchers (and certainly not 
practitioners). And while many of our findings will resonate with practitioners’ experiences and 
consultants’ heuristics, the theory of PIP implementation has not yet been well developed by scholars. There 
is value to both OM researchers and practitioners in integrating several strands of management theory and 
applying them to the specific challenges of transferring PIPs to PD contexts. This is relevant for the specific 
instance of Lean and Six Sigma, from which we derived our data at DevCo, as well as other PIP constructs 
like Agile and Scrum. In general, we provide further evidence that transferring PIPs to new contexts is not 
simple and intuitive, and that “one size” does not fit all situations. Viewing process improvement in PD 
contexts as an issue of organizational change begins the journey towards an integrated approach with both 
challenges and opportunities. 
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